However, from our research it soon became obvious that among practitioners there is a moral vacuum on this question. This arises because doctors have both to respect human life and to accept the mortality of man. At all levels there was confusion about questions such as 'Who is responsible for death when treatment is withdrawn?' and 'Why is it not necessary always to treat?'. This could be stated simply as problems over the distinction between killing and letting die. However, from the outset it was clear that the problem begins with the difference between two extremes keeping a patient alive at all costs (vitalism) and seeking to bring about death (euthanasia).
THE APPLETON GUIDELINES
The Appleton International Conference on Decisions to Forgo Life-Prolonging Treatment proposed four 'fonts' as a basic framework for respecting the dignity of human lifel.
These are autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice. Autonomy is described as a moral obligation to respect each other's autonomy insofar as such respect is compatible with respect for the autonomy of all affected. Non-maleficence is not to harm deliberately, although risks can be taken. Beneficence is to benefit others. Justice is to act justly and fairly to others.
One weakness of Appleton is that the four fonts are of different weights: they bow to different circumstances and they are prone to different interpretations in different cultures. This is amply clear from the confusion and dissent over the Appleton Conference conclusion that a competent patient's request for treatment, whether to prolong or to end his or her life, carries a strong prima facie obligation within certain bounds. Furthermore, the document itself admits that these principles are insufficient in exhausting the moral content of medicine1.
WHY THE APPLETON PRINCIPLES MISLEAD
For those who apply the Appleton principles there is an important stumbling-block. Autonomy is respect for self, yet it has limits because it must bow to the just rights of others. What is possible in a first-world hospital is impossible in a third-world hospital. In brief, the principles of autonomy and justice are inter-related: they are not absolute in themselves or even when taken together. This is simply because the patient in the next bed has the right to have the same principles applied to him or her; thus their application depends on the way each can be fulfilled in a societal setting. This is the fundamental flaw of advance directives, because we cannot force others to carry out a particular action without its societal consequences being taken into account.
However, personhood is not subservient in this way. So the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence have a different quality. They are expressions of respect for life; they imply that no harm shall be done to a patient and all treatment must be in the patient's best interest. These principles are absolute in character and permit no exceptions. Thus the application of these principles is radically different from autonomy and justice.
In practice this is the difference between clinical judgment and clinical intention. Clinical judgment has to take into account the patient, the family, the situation in the ward, the policy of the hospital, and the expectations of 504 Confusion has arisen because the Appleton Conference relativized these principles. The effect of relativizing all four principles is that life becomes relative to societal circumstances. Then the doctor, instead of being the patient's advocate, becomes a servant of market forces. To deal with this fatal flaw, a realistic respect for human life must come before the four principles a realism that accepts the mortality of humankind. If one accepts the mortality of man, so that life need not be preserved at all costs whilst at the same time demanding an absolute respect for life, these dilemmas do not arise.
How can a policy that demands absolute respect for life be compatible with the notion that life need not be preserved at all costs? The answer is that respect for life arises from the person this human life carries. All the major religions teach that it is the person that is immortal, though physical life itself is mortal. This combination of respect for the person and acceptance of the mortality of humankind is basic to medicine. For these reasons doctors must not strive at all costs to keep a person alive nor seek to bring about death, for life is not an optional quality of being but the essence of being.
Bioethics begins from the principle that decision-making concerning death cannot be separated from decision-making concerning life. This means that the responsibility for life in curative or palliative medicine demands we take all reasonable means to preserve life whilst taking into account the burden of such treatment on the patient, the staff, the family and the community. However, since clinical judgments differ on whether a disease is curable or not, it is evident that two stages need distinguishing.
A good clinician has the wisdom to distinguish the treatable from the untreatable. At the first stage, if treatment is proposed, the doctor must have cogent reasons for thinking it will benefit the patient i.e. it must be nature-assisting and life-enhancing. The second stage is when a treatment is no longer appropriate. This may be because the body itself can no longer sustain life, or the means used to sustain life are out of proportion to the level of life achieved. It is at this point that the physicians' and attendants' dilemma of killing versus letting die becomes acute. Two questions arise. First, does the removal of treatment, in the knowledge that such an action will cause death, amount to killing the patient-the problem of chains
Chains of causality and clinical intention
In direct acts of commission chains of causality are clear: if an act has a known and foreseen effect, it must be imputable to the doer. Direct acts of commission are those for which the means taken portray the clinical intention to end life. However, in indirect acts of commission, where the clinical intention is to treat the disease symptoms, death will be only one of several possible effects and may not be the one intended. In this case the act is not imputable to the doer except through negligence. In acts of omission the chain of causality can be established only if, first, the one who failed to act had a duty to act and could perform the action and, second, the omission was a direct cause of the outcome. It is the second part of this condition for causality that causes the difficulty.
The key here is the phrase 'To directly cause the outcome'. This means the doctor's clinical intention is to end life by omission or commission and the clinical action causes death. If there is not a direct connection the causality chain is broken.
Appropriateness of treatment
If the patient has irretrievably entered the dying process then a treatment may be removed because the time to die has arrived for this patient. Thus, the appropriateness of treatment will depend not only on its utility but also on its burden for the patient, the family, carers, and staff. This means that suspension of treatment may advance death but is not the cause of death. Although we may not kill ourselves or another, we are not bound to keep ourselves or others alive by every means available. It is upon these principles of bioethics that our code of practice stands.
PROPOSALS
At root the dilemma concerns a societal view of the patient-particularly, the way today's decision-making takes account of the burden of long-term treatment and suffering. We propose three principles, none of which can stand alone but whose interaction gives the doctor tools to solve moral dilemmas at the end of life.
Components of the code
Treatment of patients must reflect the inherent dignity of every person irrespective of age, debility, dependence, race, colour or creed A fundamental principle of medicine is respect for the person. If we do not begin here, rights and duties can mean whatever society decides. Respect for the person is the basis of the ancient Hippocratic Oath. Medical and of causality? Second, is the current treatment appropriate? 505 nursing management must acknowledge not simply an equal-opportunity approach, where discrimination is totally absent, but also respect for the individual person at all stages of life. This is crucial when medical treatment is withdrawn. The value of the person does not depend on whether a treatment is useful or not; though treatment may stop, tending by medical and nursing staff should never be withdrawn.
Actions taken must reflect the needs of the patient where he or she is
The current needs of the patient, in the place where he or she is, and the inviolability of the individual form the basis of the imperative to act in the patient's best interest. The achievement of this inevitably involves clinical, ethical, spiritual and resource considerations: clinical, in so far as the patient's health and continued well-being should be the objective of all medical intervention; ethical, insofar as the decision on treatment will have to take into account the effects of treatment on the family, the staff, the hospital and the community; spiritual, insofar as treatment affects the inner spirit of the patient; resource, since medical resources are limited and justice may require that those with a greater claim come first. Clearly, therefore, the decision requires a balancing of the perceived burdens and benefits to patient, family, staff, hospital and community. This is a professional judgment and the responsibility for the decision is the doctor's. All actions taken must reflect the highest standards of professional behaviour, for this basic attitude portrays the values of humanity.
Decisions taken must value the person and accept human mortality
The rule is that decision-making concerning death cannot be separated from decision-making concerning life because the intent of the doctor is to do no harm2. Without this, patients would lose confidence in the profession. When this is applied to irreversible illness three questions occurwhether the patient's life is sustainable, not in terms of the quality of life but of the expected outcome of the treatment; whether the burden of the treatment proposed can be supported by the patient, family and staff; and whether the patient can choose his or her own treatment.
Wisdom dictates that in certain circumstances sustaining life may be technically feasible but inappropriate. Life is not to be preserved at all costs. When a treatment is no longer appropriate in that it is no longer nature-assisting, either because the body itself can no longer sustain life or because the means used to sustain life are out of proportion to the life achieved, the mortality of humankind should be accepted and death allowed to take its course.
Thus, one should aim either to improve or to maintain the present state of health, and enable the patient and family to live as normal a life as possible. In communicating with patients it is important to give a truthful picture of their state of health, in a way that enables them to accept the consequences of treatment.
The trend in medicine is to help patients make decisions. Though patients have the right to refuse optimal treatment, doctors may not abdicate their professional responsibility. The doctor-patient relationship can only have meaning within these parameters; otherwise doctors become technicians and patients act as diagnosticians. Furthermore, if patients have the right to refuse treatment, then in accepting that right doctors and nursing staff still have a duty to tend. CONCLUSION We have expressed three moral principles that should govern clinical practice. The interaction of these three principles puts clinical judgment into an ethical concept of tending. We acknowledge that the tending that patients receive will be limited by the doctor's skills, by the expert opinion available to him or her, and by resources. But it will always be patient-centred.
